Briones v. Bon Secours Health by unknown
2003 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-25-2003 
Briones v. Bon Secours Health 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2003 
Recommended Citation 
"Briones v. Bon Secours Health" (2003). 2003 Decisions. 433. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2003/433 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 




UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                    
NO. 02-3504
                    
 BLANDINA BRIONES; JESSE MANIOS; ELIA SERRANO; DONNA VISCARDI;
FRED MEYER; JOYCE GRAHAM; ESSIE DALLAS; DORA BUTHER;
VALENTINO CHIAVELLO; GABRIEL DEJESUS; MIGUEL MIRANDA;
ELLA PARCHUF; ELIAS RAMOS; EFRAIN RIVERA;
HECTOR VALENTIN; SYLVIA VANCE
Appellants
v.
*BON SECOURS HEALTH SYSTEM; *BON SECOURS NEW JERSEY HEALTH
SYSTEM, INC.; ST. FRANCIS HOSPITAL; *BON SECOURS & CANTERBURY
PARTNERSHIP FOR CARE, INC.; JOHN DOE (1-12); XYZ CORPORATIONS (1-12)
*Per Clerk’s Order of 10/8/02
                    
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 01-cv-04146)
District Judge:  Honorable John C. Lifland
                   
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 3, 2003
BEFORE:  ALITO, ROTH and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed June 25, 2003 )
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OPINION OF THE COURT
                    
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:
Appellants Blandina Briones, Jesse Manios, Elia Serrano, Donna Viscardi,
Fred Meyer, Joyce Graham, Essie Dallas, Dora Buther, Valentino Chiavello, Gabriel
DeJesus, Miguel Miranda, Ella Parchuf, Elias Ramos, Efrain Rivera, Hector Valentin, and
Sylvia Vance (collectively, “Appellants”) brought suit in a New Jersey state court against
their former employers, Bon Secours Health System, Inc., Bon Secours New Jersey
Health System, Inc., St. Francis Hospital, Bon Secours & Canterbury Partnership for
Care, Inc., and certain other unnamed defendants (collectively, “Appellees”).  Appellees
removed the case to federal court.  Appellants moved to remand, asserting that they had
raised no federal question in their complaint and that there was no other basis for federal
jurisdiction.  The District Court denied the motion to remand and, later, entered an order
dismissing their claims because they were preempted by federal law.  Appellants now
appeal, challenging both the denial of their motion to remand and the dismissal of their
claims as preempted.  
As we will explain hereafter, it is clear that the District Court properly
dismissed the complaint on preemption grounds.  The only debatable issue is whether the
District Court, without proceeding further, should have remanded to the state court for it
3to address Appellees’ federal preemption defenses and any remaining issues.  We
conclude that its retention of jurisdiction was appropriate.
I.
In early 2001, Appellees transformed St. Francis Hospital, an acute care
facility, into a rehabilitation facility, resulting in layoffs.  Appellees and the employees of
St. Francis, including Appellants, had negotiated, some years before, a Collective
Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) that determined the terms and conditions of the
employment relationship, and remained in force in early 2001.  This CBA also provided
procedures to be followed in the event of layoffs, including a process by which
employees, who had lost their positions in one hospital, would be able to “slot”
themselves into positions at another hospital based on seniority and other factors.  When
the transformation from acute care to rehabilitation was announced, Appellees and union
representatives discussed the layoffs that would necessarily result and worked out a plan
for their execution.  Several appellants were laid off as a result of this process; others
declined to participate in the slotting process and lost their jobs as a result. 
Thereafter, the union filed two unfair labor practice charges against
Appellees with the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”). The union alleged that the
decision to transform St. Francis, as opposed to another, non-union hospital under
Appellees’ control, was the result of anti-union bias and that Appellees had unlawfully
withdrawn recognition of the union as the representative for the employees of St. Francis
4hospital.  The NLRB assumed jurisdiction over the complaints, stating that they alleged
violations of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. 
However, the NLRB found no merit to either claim and dismissed them.
Appellants’ original state court complaint contained two counts.  Count One
alleged a violation of Article I of the New Jersey Constitution which, inter alia ,
guarantees the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively and “prohibits
dismissal of an employee because of his or her union activities.”  Comite Organizador de
Trabajadores Agricolas (COTA) v. Molivelli, 552 A.2d 1003, 1008 (N.J. 1989).  This
claim is based on Appellees’ decision to stop its acute care operation at St. Francis, a
union facility, rather than its acute care operation at Christ Hospital, a non-union facility. 
Included in Count I was an allegation that this decision motivated by anti-union bias had
resulted in Appellees’ being offered continuing employment only if they were willing to
accept positions with Christ Hospital with lesser pay and benefits than provided in their
CBA and to “forfeit [other] entitlements available” under the CBA.  SA at 009.  Count
Two of the complaint asserted a state law “intentional infliction of severe emotional
distress” claim based on the same facts as Count One.
Appellees removed the case to federal court, arguing that since appellants’
claims required the interpretation of the CBA, § 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 144, et seq., completely preempted their claims and
jurisdiction in the federal courts was proper.  Appellants moved to remand the
     1Section 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157, provides, in relevant part:
[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have
the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that
such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3)
[29 USCS § 158(a)(3)]. 
Section 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158, provides, in relevant part:
(a) Unfair labor practices by employer.  It shall be an unfair labor practice
for an employer--
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 7 [29 USCS § 157];
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any
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proceedings to state court, asserting that their complaint did not rely on or mention any
federal statute.  The District Court denied their motion to remand, noting that Appellants
based their claim in part on their loss of rights under the CBA and that their claim could
not be adjudicated without a determination of the contours of those rights under that
agreement.
After the briefing on Appellees’ motion to remand but nine days before that
motion was denied by the court, Appellants amended their complaint to delete the
reference to the rights secured by the CBA.
Thereafter, Appellees moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that §§
7 and 8 of the NLRA and the jurisdiction of the NLRB preempted Appellants’ claims.1 
labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it: Provided,
That subject to rules and regulations made and published by the Board
pursuant to section 6 [29 USCS § 156], an employer shall not be prohibited
from permitting employees to confer with him during working hours
without loss of time or pay;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization: Provided, That nothing in this Act, or in any other
statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an
agreement with a labor organization (not established, maintained, or
assisted by an action defined in section 8(a) of this Act [this subsection] as
an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of employment
membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of
such employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the
later, (I) if such labor organization is the representative of the employees as
provided in section 9(a) [29 USCS § 159(a)], in the appropriate collective-
bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made, and (ii) unless
following an election held as provided in section 9(e) [9 USCS § 159(e)]
within one year preceding the effective date of such agreement, the Board
shall have certified that at least a majority of the employees eligible to vote
in such election have voted to rescind the authority of such labor
organization to make such an agreement: Provided further, That no
employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for
nonmembership in a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for
believing that such membership was not available to the employee on the
same terms and conditions generally applicable to other members, or (B) if
he has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or
terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the
periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of
acquiring or retaining membership;
(4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he
has filed charges or given testimony under this Act;
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees, subject to the provisions of section 9(a) [29 USCS § 159(a)].
6
This motion was granted, and this appeal followed.
II.
     2Section 301 provides that “[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and
a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined
in this Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court
7
Since “[r]emoval jurisdiction under section 1441 is . . . wholly derived from
original federal jurisdiction,”  Roxbury Condo. Assoc., Inc. v. Anthony S. Cupo Agency,
316 F.3d 224, 227 (3d Cir. 2003), a court must, in determining the propriety of removal,
determine whether grounds for federal jurisdiction exist.  Because the parties to this case
were not diverse, the District Court was required to determine whether federal question
jurisdiction existed. 
In general, under the “well-pleaded complaint” rule, a court looks to the
face of a complaint to determine whether a federal claim has been raised, because the
plaintiff is “master of the claim.”  Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). 
For that reason, “a case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal
defense, including the defense of preemption, even if the defense is anticipated in the
plaintiff’s complaint, and even if both parties concede that the federal defense is the only
question truly at issue.”  Id. at 393.  However, the doctrine of complete preemption
provides an exception to this rule:  “[o]n occasion, the Court has concluded that the pre-
emptive force of a statute is so extraordinary that it converts an ordinary state common-
law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint
rule.”  Id.  When that occurs, federal subject matter jurisdiction exists and removal is
proper.  Section 3012 of the LMRA is such a statute.  Id.  If § 301 applies to a claim in the
of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.”  28 U.S.C. § 185(a).
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complaint, therefore, the claim is completely preempted and removal is proper.  Id. at
394.
Because of the general rule that the plaintiff is master of his claim, where a
well-pleaded state complaint contains only claims based on state law that are not
“completely preempted,” a federal court to which the case has been removed must remand
to the state court for a determination of the issues presented.  Lingle v. Norge Div. of
Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988).  This may include the issue of whether there is a
meritorious preemption defense.  Conversely, when the federal court determines that the
state claim is “completely preempted” by a federal law, it must decline to remand the case
to state court and resolve for itself the issues presented.  See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr.
Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1983). 
Section 301 completely preempts claims if they “substantially depend upon
analysis of the terms of an agreement made between parties in a labor contract.”  Angst v.
Mack Trucks, Inc., 969 F.2d 1530, 1536 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Allis Chalmers Corp. v.
Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985)).  In light of these Supreme Court pronouncements, we
have held that there is complete preemption under § 301 where “the plaintiff, in its well-
pleaded complaint, . . . plead[s] an action that requires interpretation of [a] collective
bargaining agreement.”  Berda v. CBS Inc., 881 F.2d 20, 25 (3d. Cir. 1989).
9By contrast, §§ 7 and 8 of the NLRA, the other provisions of federal law
relied upon by Appellees in support of their preemption argument, do not “completely
preempt” state law and thus provide no basis for removal jurisdiction.  Ethridge v. Harbor
House Restaurant, 861 F.2d 1389, 1396-1401 (9th Cir. 1988).  Cf. Caterpillar, 482 U.S.
at 397-98 (stating that, if the employer so desired, it could argue that §§ 7 and 8
preempted the claim to the state court upon remand).
Though Appellants, after removal, amended their complaint, “the nature of
plaintiff’s claim must be evaluated, and the propriety of remand decided, on the basis of
the record as it stands at the time the petition for removal is filed.”  Westmoreland Hosp.
Ass’n. v. Blue Cross, 605 F.2d 119, 123 (3d Cir. 1979).  Thus, we “base decisions about
subject matter jurisdiction after removal on the plaintiff’s complaint as it existed at the
time that the defendant filed the removal petition.”  Prince v. Rescorp Realty, 940 F.2d
1104, 1105 n.2 (7th Cir. 1991) (quotation and emphasis omitted). 
In their state court complaint, Appellants based their claims in part on their
loss of rights under the CBA.  As a result, those claims could not be adjudicated without
interpreting the CBA and comparing the rights, benefits and entitlements there guaranteed
with Appellants’ positions after the allegedly discriminatory decision to transform St.
Francis.  That fact alone is sufficient to implicate § 301 of the LMRA and to completely
preempt Appellants’ claims.  Berda, 881 F.2d at 25.  It necessarily follows that the
District Court properly decided to exercise jurisdiction and deny the motion to remand.
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III.
Having determined that the District Court properly exercised jurisdiction,
we now turn to its disposition of Appellants’ claims. 
“When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the [NLRA], the
States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National
Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be
averted.”  San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959).  “Pre-
emption . . . is designed to shield the system from conflicting regulation of conduct.  It is
the conduct being regulated, not the formal description of governing legal standards, that
is the proper focus of concern.”  Amalgamated Assoc. of Street, Elec. Railway & Motor
Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 292 (1971). “Garmon preemption protects
the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB over unfair labor practice proceedings;
accordingly, if a cause of action implicates protected concerted activity under section 7 of
the NLRA or conduct that would be prohibited as an unfair labor practice under section 8
of the NLRA, the cause of action is preempted.”  Voilas v. General Motors Corp., 170
F.3d 367, 378 (3d Cir. 1999). 
The claims brought by Appellants are preempted by sections 7 & 8 of the
NLRA. First of all, “[i]f the [NLRB] decides, subject to appropriate federal judicial
review, that conduct is protected by § 7, or prohibited by § 8, then the matter is at an end,
and the States are ousted of all jurisdiction.”  Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245.  Such a decision
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has the same effect upon the jurisdiction of a federal court.  Id.  In this case, the NLRB
accepted jurisdiction over substantially similar claims brought by the union, and found
that while they alleged violations of § 8, there was no evidence of discrimination. 
Appellants may not relitigate that determination in our court.  
Moreover, even if the NLRB had not exercised jurisdiction over the same
subject matter, it is clear that both Counts One and Two of Appellants’ complaint, at the
very least, “arguably implicate” the NLRA.  Section 8(a)(3) prohibits discrimination
having the effect of encouraging or discouraging union membership or participation in
union activities.  That is precisely the gravamen of Appellants’ claims.  This is not a case
in which the behavior is of “peripheral concern” to the federal law.  Voilas, 170 F.3d at
378-79.  The allegations are of behavior that, if true, would violate core prohibitions of
the NLRA.
IV.
We will affirm the order of the district court dismissing the complaint.
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TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing Not Precedential Opinion.
 /s/ Walter K. Stapleton
Circuit Judge
